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hohenheim.de 1. Introduction 
It is widely assumed that a common currency makes it desirable to have also a common 
fiscal policy (and some go even so far as saying as the euro needs to be backed up by a 
political union).
2 However, this is not a foregone conclusion if one accepts that fiscal 
policy can also be a source of shocks. There are a variety of reasons why fiscal policy 
could be destabilizing: policy makers do not have a full control over the outcome, at 
times the effect of a certain measure (e.g. a tax reform) is quite different from what is 
anticipated; or the economic forecasts underlying fiscal policy might turn out to be 
wrong. In the following it is thus assumed that fiscal policy represents a source of shocks. 
The key question then is whether a higher correlation of these shocks (presumably 
because of tighter cooperation) is desirable. The simple answer is that in general it might 
be better to have independent national fiscal policies that are not coordinated because this 
leads to risk diversification: the variance of a sum of shocks is lower the lower the 
covariance among the individual components. 
 
2. The model 
The key idea is illustrated in the following simplified model of a two country monetary 
union: 
yt  = −αit
e + ft + βyt* (1) 
yt* = −αit
e + ft* + β*yt  (2) 
                                                           
2 For a survey on the first issue see, for instance, Gandolfo (2001, pp. 344 ff.). For an introduction into the 
second aspect see Gros and Thygesen (1998, pp. 545 ff.). 
  1mt
e= φyt + (1−φ)yt* − δ
–1it
e  (3) 
where, as usual, yt stands for income, ft stands for a demand shock (here meant to be an 
error in the fiscal policy stance). A starred variable refers to the foreign country (or the 
rest of the monetary union). The parameters β and β* designate the marginal propensities 
to import from the partner country. 
The money supply, mt, and the interest rate, it, have the superscript e because in a 
common currency area there is only one interest rate and one monetary policy. Equations 
(1) and (2) represent conventional LS curves. δ stands for the inverse of the interest 
elasticity of money demand. φ and (1−φ) are the weights of the two countries in the 
overall EMU-wide money demand (presumably related to their economic weights). 
What are the ‘spillover’ effects of demand shocks (e.g. fiscal policy) in this simplified 
environment? This can be found by solving the model for income in both countries. 
Using equation (3) in equation (2) yields: 
yt*[1 + αδ(1−φ)] = (β* − αδφ)yt + αδmt
e + ft* (4) 
Using equation (3) in equation (1) yields, mutatis mutandis, a similar equation for the 
home country. The solution for home income is then: 
yt[1 + αδφ] = (β − αδ(1−φ))yt* + αδmt
e + ft  (5) 
Substituting out foreign income yields a more complicated expression which contains 
only yt: 
yt[1 + αδφ] = αδmt
e + ft + [β − αδ(1−φ)][1 + αδ(1−φ)]
−1 
  2 [(β* − αδφ)yt + αδmt
e + ft*] (6) 
This can be solved to yield:  
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Or somewhat simplified: 
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αδ β φ αδ β φ αδ ) 1 ( * ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1
    (7) 
This equation implies that the effect of a positive demand shock abroad on the home 
country’s income could be either negative or positive depending on the sign of the 
expression in square brackets that multiplies ft*. Given that the denominator of this 
expression   is positive, the spillover effects are positive only if the direct demand 
effect, β, is larger than the interest-rate effect, αδ(1−φ). If these two effects are equal, 
there is no spillover. The relative strength of the interest-rate effect depends on the size of 
the foreign country (or rest of EMU), (1−φ), multiplied by the product of the interest 
elasticity of money demand and the elasticity of final demand with respect to the interest 
rate. 
∆
However, for a country that is only a small part of EMU, both β (the marginal propensity 
to import from the rest of the EMU) and (1−φ) are likely to be large. These two 
parameters should thus vary in the same direction. Hence there is no simple presumption 
that the spillover effect changes sign with country size. However, there are in reality large 
differences even among EU-15 member countries (and even more among the new 
members) in terms of their trade integration with the euro zone. Hence, the probability 
that the spillover effects are positive should be higher for countries that for reason of 
  3geography (or specialization in particular products) trade more with the euro zone i.e., 
(e.g. Belgium versus Greece). The absolute value of the spillover effect is also influenced 
by the multiplier in the denominator, which is always positive since β,β* < 1, and which 
is increasing or decreasing in β depending on the size of the spillover effect. 
The effect of the demand shocks in equation (7) is implicitly based on the assumption 
that the Union-wide money supply is held constant. This would correspond to money 
supply targeting by the ECB along the lines of that of the Bundesbank. If the ECB 
targeted interest rates, the spillover effect would of course be positive, since there would 
be no offsetting impact from higher rates. However, in this latter case there would be 
pressure on prices to rise throughout the euro area. Thus, it is likely that the ECB will 
increase interest rates if fiscal policy becomes expansionary even if it does not have a 
formal money supply target (only a reference value). 
 
3. Spillover effects and the desirability of fiscal policy coordination 
In this simplified model one can now calculate how the variability of home country 
output is affected by the variance of the home and foreign demand shock, as well as their 
covariance.  
For simplicity it is assumed that both shocks are distributed normally with standard 
deviation  (and  ) and covariance, covariance(f, f*).  σ
∗ σ
The variance of domestic output is then given by: 
() [] [ ] { 2 * ) 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( 1 2 var σ φ αδ β σ φ αδ 2 2
t
y − − + − + − ∆ = iance  
      [] [ ] } *) , ( cov ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 2 f f ariance φ αδ β φ αδ − − − + +        (8) 
  4Assuming the two countries have the same likelihood to make errors in their fiscal policy 
the two standard deviations should be equal. The key element in this expression is then 
the sign and size of the covariance and the product which pre-multiplies this covariance, 
i.e. [] [) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 ] φ αδ β φ αδ − − − + . If the spillover effects of demand shocks are positive, i.e. 
if the second expression in square brackets is positive, a high (positive) covariance 
between foreign and domestic shocks will mean a high variance of domestic output. It 
follows that (in a common monetary area) the variance of income increases if the 
correlation of fiscal shocks increases. 
If the sign of the spillover effects changes, this conclusion would also change. Whether 
more coordination of fiscal policy is desirable thus depends crucially on the spillover 
effects fiscal policy has. For instance, some calculations of the welfare gains from 
international policy coordination among the G3 show that the gains from policy 
coordination are ambiguous.
3 However, we would like to argue that modeling and 
estimating the sign and magnitude of the cross-country spillovers among member 
countries under EMU is straightforward. Due to the high degree of intra-EMU trade, 
spillover effects of demand shocks should generally have a positive sign. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The simple model used here was just meant to illustrate a general idea, which should hold 
up in more sophisticated models as well. Our main result is that in general it might be 
better to have independent national fiscal policies that are not coordinated under EMU, 
                                                           
3 As an early source, see Frankel and Rockett (1988) on coordination between the US and the rest of the 
world. 
  5because this leads to risk diversification: the variance of a sum of shocks is lower the 
lower the covariance among the individual components. 
Our analytical results show again that the excessive deficits procedure in the Maastricht 
Treaty is likely to remain the much more useful approach to fiscal policy than the 
Keynesian view of the 60s, namely the (nearly) complete centralization of fiscal policy 
according to the Werner plan and the influential MacDougall Report.
4 According to our 
analysis, this is valid independent on whether the ECB targets money growth or interest 
rates and is anyway justified with an eye on the fact that the European social security 
systems must be tightened to the mast in order to be prepared for the increasing burden 
from population ageing. 
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